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CASES AND CONTROVERSIES: SOME THINGS TO DO 
WITH CONTRACTS CASES 
Charles L. Knapp* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly a century and a half has passed since Christopher Columbus 
Langdell waded ashore at Harvard Law School, bringing to its benighted 
natives the civilizing influence of law study through the “case method.”1 
Like his namesake, Langdell has long since sailed on to a more distant 
shore, but his legacy remained at the heart of legal instruction 
throughout the twentieth century, and persists into the present day. 
As a co-author of one of the two dozen or more currently-in-print 
Contracts casebooks,2 I obviously have both a point of view about, and a 
personal stake in, the survival of this particular method of instruction. 
Whether the legal casebook—or any other book, in the form of bound 
sheets of paper—will remain a part of our academic culture much longer 
is clearly up for grabs, however. Electronic records have so many 
advantages over the printed page that, at least for many purposes, they 
will surely become the dominant form of preserving, retrieving, and 
transmitting information, if indeed they are not already. But through 
whatever medium, I hope that legal training will continue to retain the 
study of “cases” as an important component of a legal education. In this 
brief discussion I will ruminate a little about the various ways in which 
case study can contribute to law study—or at least to the study of 
contract law, the area with which I am most familiar. 
Stretching back at least to Richard Danzig’s 1975 exploration3 of 
Hadley v. Baxendale,4 contracts scholars have engaged in what is 
* Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law. 
1. See generally BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: 
C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 140–60 (2009) (discussing case method). 
2. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT 
LAW (7th ed. 2012). 
3. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 249 (1975). 
4. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. 
1357 
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sometimes referred to as “legal archaeology.”5 They examine well-
known contracts cases from a variety of angles—historical, sociological, 
economic, or what-have-you—to see what insights can be gleaned 
therefrom.6 Many cases familiar to several generations of law students 
have been subjected to this kind of inquiry, with interesting and 
sometimes surprising results. Besides Hadley, prominent cases given 
this sort of in-depth analysis include Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & 
Mining Co.,7 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico,8 Kirksey v. Kirksey,9 
Mills v. Wyman,10 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,11 and 
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.12 I did a little digging in this ground 
myself, some years ago, with an exploration of J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. 
Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc.13 Even some unpublished studies in this genre 
have found their way into semi-circulation.14 These individual pieces 
have in turn spawned anthologies in which such case studies are 
collected for law students, teachers, and other interested parties.15 
5. See Debora L. Threedy, Unearthing Subversion with Legal Archaeology, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN 
& L. 133, 135 (2003); see also Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of 
Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
6. See Threedy, supra note 5, at 135. 
7. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962); see Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 
Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995). 
8. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); see Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. 
Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 185. 
9. 8 Ala. 131 (1845); see William R. Casto & Val D. Ricks, “Dear Sister Antillico . . .”: The 
Story of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 94 GEO. L.J. 321 (2006). 
10. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825); see Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills 
v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749 (1997); see also Curtis W. Nyquist, Contract 
Theory, Single Case Research, and the Massachusetts Archives, 3 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 53 (1997). 
11. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Eben Colby, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625 (2002); Muriel Morisey 
Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89 
(1994). 
12. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); see William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red 
Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2010). 
13. 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977); see Charles L. Knapp, Judgment Call: Theoretical Approaches 
to Contract Decision-Making, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 307. 
14. In an unpublished manuscript, Professor Kellye Y. Testy has discussed the results of her 
research into the background of the dispute adjudicated in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 54 
Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), which revealed facts very different from those alleged in the 
plaintiff’s complaint. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS 
IN CONTRACT LAW: TEACHER’S MANUAL 7–11 (6th ed. 2007). 
15. E.g., CONTRACTS STORIES (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007); RICHARD DANZIG & GEOFFREY R. 
WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN 
CASES (2d ed. 2004). 
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Professor Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World16 is 
somewhat different in its approach. It aims to interest the modern reader 
in the stories of literally dozens of contract disputes, many of which 
have some present-day resonance, with an eye toward assembling these 
bits and pieces into a structure more or less recognizable as the 
American common law of contract. Although I admire both the ambition 
of Professor Cunningham’s reach and the achievement of his grasp, my 
aim here is a much more modest one: it is merely to discuss some of the 
ways in which over several decades of teaching I have employed 
individual cases as part of the study of contract law. 
I. CHESTNUTS COASTING ON AN OPEN FIRE: THE 
CASEBOOK TRADITION 
Particularly from the perspective of a casebook author (or editor, if 
you prefer), it seems that no method of case selection is more time-
honored (or more vulnerable to criticism) than the recycling of old 
“chestnuts” familiar to generation after generation of law students. These 
are cases that one remembers for their facts—often odd, sometimes 
funny, always in some sense “memorable”—more than for their legal 
content. What law student does not remember at least some of the 
following cases: the broken mill-shaft;17 the wrong (non-“Reading”) 
pipe;18 the falling block;19 the nephew’s reward for not smoking;20 the 
bridge to nowhere;21 the hairy hand;22 the carbolic smoke ball;23 the two 
ships “Peerless”;24 the surprisingly pregnant cow;25 or the letter to “sister 
Antillico”?26 Each of these cases has seemed to many instructors over 
the years to nicely encapsulate a legal principle important to contract 
law. 
Some of them, at least, seem to be irreplaceable. But taken in toto, 
16. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR 
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012). 
17. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. 
18. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921). 
19. Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). 
20. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
21. See Rockingham Cnty. v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929). 
22. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 641 (N.H. 1929). 
23. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
24. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
25. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (Mich. 1887). 
26. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 132 (1845). 
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they represent a kind of laziness on the part of casebook authors, and 
whether they are effective tools for actually teaching the principles they 
exemplify is questionable. What law student in fact does remember the 
contract rule illustrated by the broken mill-shaft, the wrong pipe, the 
falling block, and all the rest? These are the nursery rhymes of law 
study, the little vignettes that are part of the shared memory of us all. As 
with “Ring Around the Rosy,” however, we tend to remember the 
children’s game and forget the plague.27 
Having said that, I too plead guilty, with a set of explanations: (a) 
some of these cases actually do seem memorable both factually and 
legally, although reasonable people would doubtless differ as to which 
ones those are; (b) I just can’t bear to part with some of them myself; 
and (c) contracts teachers protest when time-honored favorites are 
omitted. Even so, my co-authors and I have managed over time to kick 
off the back of our sled some cases whose place once seemed secure: 
Raffles v. Wichelhaus;28 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua 
County Bank;29 and Hawkins v. McGee.30 A good teacher can still pull 
fire out of these chestnuts, but relying too heavily on cases like these is 
playing it too safe. 
II. WHAT’S GOING ON HERE? CONTRACT IN CONTEXT 
Whether a case is a revered chestnut or a newly-discovered acorn, 
most of us expect it to do something more than just quote a rule in 
highlightable form; we expect it also to show or tell the student 
something about the rule that is not apparent just from its mere 
statement. This, after all, is the raison d’etre of the case method; 
otherwise we would just state the rule and ask students to apply it. And 
of course that’s something most of us do anyway, either on our own or 
with the help of a casebook editor or other source: pose a hypothetical 
problem and ask our students to apply to it a rule or set of rules they are 
learning. But actual cases—true stories of events that come packaged in 
judicial opinions—may not only provide an answer to the legal issue 
posed by a set of facts, but also illustrate how a legal rule works in a 
concrete context. 
27. Whether “Ring around the Rosy” actually has anything to do with the Black Plague is a 
matter of dispute. See Ralph Slovenko, “When the Saints Go Marching In,” 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
553, 554 n.3 (2000) (noting disagreement). The metaphor was irresistible, however. 
28. Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
29. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
30. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
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The following more or less random examples show how cases can 
add context to legal rules, and illustrate some property of the doctrine or 
rule at issue that might not be apparent just from its statement. In 
Normile v. Miller,31 would-be realty buyers learn that a counter-offer, 
like the original offer, can be freely revoked unless supported by 
consideration,32 and that those who “snooze” are apt to “lose.”33 In 
Dougherty v. Salt,34 a beloved nephew discovers that his late aunt’s 
generous monetary promise may not be enforceable even if made in 
what looks like a formal, “legal” document35 (and incidentally, that 
gratuitous legal advice is apt to be worth its price36). In Plowman v. 
Indian Refining Co.,37 retired employees find that even if promises of 
pensions are made at the time of their discharge, those may not be 
enforceable absent some “consideration” received by their employer,38 
even if the court feels badly about that.39 However, in Harvey v. Dow,40 
a father learns that an earlier generous promise to his daughter may be 
enforceable after all if it results in a substantial financial change of 
position on her part.41 Some of these rules are “technical,” while some 
are “equitable”; taken together they may seem confusing and 
contradictory. Encountering real people in real situations helps the 
student to see how and why the rules have developed as they have, and 
why they may apply in some situations but not in others. 
If cases are helpful in understanding rules of common law, they seem 
well-nigh indispensable in understanding some complex statutory 
provisions, such as Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-207.42 
Without the aid of one or more cases like Brown Machine, Inc. v. 
Hercules, Inc.,43 this statutory rule is virtually impossible to comprehend 
or apply; with a concrete example, it takes on a little life of its own, and 
becomes potentially manageable. Somewhat the same could be said of 
31. 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985). 
32. See id. at 18. 
33. See id. 
34. 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919). 
35. See id. at 95. 
36. See id. at 94. 
37. 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937). 
38. See id. at 2, 4. 
39. See id. at 5. 
40. 962 A.2d 322 (Me. 2008). 
41. See id. at 326. 
42. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002). 
43. 770 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
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UCC section 2-201.44 This provision is not nearly so complex or 
puzzling as section 2-207, but still, a case like Buffaloe v. Hart45 can 
help the student understand not only how the statute does what it does, 
but why. 
III. WHAT’S INSIDE THE BALLPARK? ALTERNATE 
SOLUTIONS 
Recognizing that this may simply be my own bias at work, it has 
nevertheless always seemed to me that, more than any other “basic” law 
course, Contracts offers the opportunity to open students’ eyes to the fact 
that American law—particularly common law, but not only that—does 
not necessarily produce a single “right” answer when applied to a fact 
pattern, real or hypothetical. Although this lesson can be overdone, 
particularly for students who already have some sophistication about 
legal matters, the fact remains that most of our students arrive in law 
school assuming that for every legal question there may be a lot of 
wrong answers, but only one “right” one. One of our most important 
responsibilities as law teachers is to demonstrate that, given the 
plasticity of language plus the infinite variety of possible fact patterns, 
there is often more than one plausible answer to a legal question—
sometimes there are two, sometimes more than that. When solving legal 
problems, the question is not simply: “what answer is the correct one?” 
but rather: “how many ‘ballpark’ answers are there?” “what are they?” 
“among them, which is the most correct, and why?” and “what does it 
mean for an answer to be ‘correct,’ anyway?” Answering these questions 
is the judge’s job, yes, but before that it is the analytical task of the 
lawyer, and training students to ask (and answer) these questions is the 
job of the law professor. 
This perspective can of course be cultivated through the medium of 
carefully composed and delicately balanced hypothetical problems (and 
on final examinations it will be). But the study and discussion of actual 
decided cases has an additional benefit. Our case method of instruction 
is routinely criticized for employing mostly appellate cases, and thereby 
overlooking the complexity and importance of the work that trial 
lawyers and trial judges do. Fair enough, and other courses in trial 
advocacy, negotiation, and alternate forms of dispute resolution can—
and increasingly, do—help make up for this deficiency. But when we 
read an appellate decision in a litigated case, we are encountering an 
44. U.C.C. § 2-201. 
45. 441 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
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actual dispute in which the legal arguments on both sides were strong 
enough for the losing side below to invest additional resources in an 
appeal. Assuming at least minimal attorney competence on both sides, 
an appellate case should therefore present a dispute in which rational 
judges could reasonably differ on the appropriate outcome. In a trial 
court, admittedly, such indeterminacy might stem simply from the 
credibility (or lack thereof) of the opposing witnesses. By the time a case 
reaches the appellate level, however, this factor should have been 
filtered out. On appeal, indeterminacy should be the result of doubt 
either about what the rule is, or about its proper application to particular 
facts. 
Once class discussion has progressed at least as far as explaining the 
basics of the case under discussion (facts, issue(s), holding, and 
reasoning is one customary formula for doing that), it is appropriate to 
discuss whether the court’s decision holds together—whether there are 
holes in the court’s understanding and presentation of the facts or in its 
reasoning to a result. But even more useful (and a lot more fun) is to 
consider one or more alternate ways in which the court could have 
decided the case, and then to compare the possible versions of a 
decision. Here are a few examples. 
In C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,46 the Iowa 
Supreme Court was faced with the defendant insurer’s denial of 
coverage for a burglary from the plaintiff’s office/warehouse.47 The 
defendant based its denial of coverage on the absence of “marks” of 
“actual force and violence” on the “exterior of the premises,” as required 
by the language of defendant insurer’s policy48—language presumably 
intended to avoid covering an “inside job.”49 There were such marks, in 
fact, but on an inside door to a chemical storage room, from which 
chemicals had been taken.50 Since there apparently was little reason to 
think this had actually been an inside job, the defendant’s stance seemed 
technically correct but substantively harsh. Reversing a judgment for the 
insurer,51 the court used the case as a vehicle for discussing generally the 
adhesive nature of insurance contracts and the appropriateness of using a 
“reasonable expectations” approach to cases like this one.52 Fair enough; 
46. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). 
47. Id. at 171. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 172. 
50. Id. at 171. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 176. 
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proponents of “modern contract law”53 might well nod approvingly. But 
the court, in defending its wide-ranging and somewhat “legislative” 
approach to the case, suggested that conventional lawyering would have 
approached the case differently: 
[I]t should be noted appellate courts take cases as they come, 
constrained by issues the litigants formulated in trial court—a 
point not infrequently overlooked by academicians. Nor can a 
lawyer in the ordinary case be faulted for not risking a client’s 
cause on an uncharted course when there is a reasonable 
prospect of reaching a fair result through familiar channels of 
long-accepted legal principles, for example, those grounded on 
ambiguity in language, the duty to define limitations or 
exclusions in clear and explicit terms, and interpretation of 
language from the viewpoint of an ordinary person, not a 
specialist or expert.54 
For the law student, here is a challenge: how might the plaintiff have 
prevailed on the basis of “familiar” and “long-accepted legal principles,” 
such as “ambiguity in language”?55 One version involves stretching the 
meaning of “exterior” by adding a hypothetical fence around the 
plaintiff’s building, thus complicating the otherwise seemingly “plain 
meaning” of the word “exterior.”56 Surely marks of forcible entry on the 
fence would then be sufficient to satisfy the policy’s terms, since the 
fence could be regarded as the “exterior” of the “premises.”57 What if 
there were no marks on the fence, but there were marks on the door of 
the building: is the fence still the “exterior”—or is that now the door 
again? Another argument might involve questioning what should be seen 
as the “premises”: could a locked interior room be regarded as the 
premises, for this purpose?58 Some arguments might be closer to the 
(metaphorical) fence than others, but still within the ballpark of being 
potentially persuasive. 
The C & J case presents essentially a case of “interpretation,” 
leavened by “adhesion contract” concerns.59 Other cases require the 
53. I have elsewhere suggested using this phrase to describe mid-twentieth century contract law, 
“liberalized” by the influence of Realist commentators and the Uniform Commercial Code. Charles 
L. Knapp, An Offer You Can’t Revoke, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 309, 317–18. 
54. C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 175. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 171. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 174–75. 
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examination and application of common-law doctrines, such as the 
distinction between “consideration,” the conventional basis for promise 
enforcement, and “promissory estoppel,” enforcement based on 
detrimental reliance. Are these concepts distinct, or do they overlap? 
How do you tell one from the other? 
In Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc.,60 plaintiff Katz, a former employee and 
sometime officer of defendant61 (which apparently made and sold 
clothing62), sued to recover payments allegedly due to him under a 
promised pension plan.63 Defendant had employed plaintiff in various 
capacities over the years, and for a time plaintiff had even been an 
officer of the company; he also happened to be the brother-in-law of 
defendant’s president, Harry Shopmaker.64 When plaintiff’s health 
began to fail (due at least in part to an injury suffered in attempting to 
protect defendant’s property from a thief), Shopmaker tried to persuade 
him to retire.65 Plaintiff was initially unwilling to do so, but finally 
agreed to retire only on the strength of a promise made by Shopmaker 
(and formally ratified by defendant’s board of directors) that defendant 
would pay him a monthly pension for life.66 Defendant made the 
payments initially, but eventually ceased, and plaintiff sued to recover 
the amounts due.67 Despite plaintiff’s invocation of earlier Missouri case 
law68 and section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts69 a Missouri trial 
court gave judgment for the defendant, accepting defendant’s argument 
that since plaintiff would have been fired anyway if he refused to 
voluntarily retire, he had suffered no actual “detriment” by quitting his 
job.70 A Missouri court of appeals reversed, however, on the ground that 
Katz had indeed detrimentally relied by voluntarily retiring, and his case 
60. 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
61. See id. at 122. 
62. “Danny Dare” was registered as a trademark for various types of clothing in 1962. The mark 
was assigned to Harry Shopmaker in 1987, and cancelled in 2011. See Danny Dare, UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=72134952&case 
Type=SERIAL_NO&searchType=statusSearch (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
63. See Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 123. 
64. See id. at 122. 
65. See id. at 122–23. 
66. See id. at 123. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 124 (discussing Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)). 
69. See id. The court’s reference is to the first Restatement of Contracts section 90; the 
Restatement (Second) version is substantially similar, and it retains the illustration based on the 
Pfeiffer case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b, illus. 4 (1981). 
70. See Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 123–24. 
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therefore came within the rule of section 90.71 
The real challenge of the Katz case lies not in deciding who should 
win (seriously? deny an aging retiree his admittedly promised pension 
payments merely because of the technicalities of contract law, and a 
heroic retiree at that?) but in explaining why. Despite the efforts of the 
appellate court, it must be conceded that under the conventional 
statement of promissory estoppel, a successful plaintiff needs to show 
that he suffered a detrimental change of position in reliance on the 
defendant’s promise.72 If the defendant truly would have fired Katz 
anyway (and the trial court in effect so found73), then his voluntary 
quitting was not a detrimental change of position, and the trial court was 
right. But Katz was determined not to quit voluntarily, and it was 
apparently important to the defendant—or at least to its president—that 
he do so.74 The act of retiring was something Katz was free not to do (in 
terms of the doctrine of consideration, it was a “legal detriment”), and 
defendant obtained Katz’s voluntary departure only by promising him in 
return a series of monthly payments.75 Whether this was a “fair” bargain 
is not supposed to matter as far as the consideration requirement is 
concerned; that’s up to the bargainers themselves to decide.76 So, 
paradoxically, the “technical” doctrine of consideration in this case 
probably does a better job of achieving justice than the supposedly more 
“equitable” one of promissory estoppel. A hypothetical question with 
similar facts could elicit the same analysis, but it would be unlikely to 
present the human elements or the emotional pull of the real-life Katz 
case. 
Another case presents a similar combination of an appealing plaintiff 
and doctrinal difficulty. Agnes Syester, like others before her,77 was 
inveigled by defendant dance studio into paying an exorbitant amount 
for dance lessons, on the strength of blandishments involving her ability 
to become an excellent, even professional, dancer, despite her somewhat 
advanced age of seventy or thereabouts.78 At one point, she became 
71. See id. at 125–26. 
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b. 
73. Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 124.  
74. See id. at 122 (Katz had held more responsible positions at Danny Dare during the course of 
his employment there; as noted above, he was the president’s brother-in-law.). 
75. See id. at 123. 
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(b) cmt. c. 
77. See generally, Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on 
Gender and Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010). Many similar cases have been 
collected by Professor Threedy. See id. at 753 n.23. 
78. See Syester v. Banta, 133 N.W.2d 666, 669–71 (Iowa 1965). 
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disenchanted with the defendant and actually engaged a lawyer to sue, 
but agreed to settle in exchange for a partial refund of her payments.79 
Eventually, however, she did sue in tort on the basis of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.80 This time she followed through, recovering 
compensatory and punitive damages substantially greater than the sum 
she had received in the earlier settlement.81 In Syester v. Banta,82 the 
jury at trial apparently believed the plaintiff’s story that she had been 
told lies on which she relied, lies that were both fraudulent and material, 
which induced her to buy more dance lessons than she could 
conceivably benefit from, or even use.83 Whether she could reasonably 
have believed those lies is of course a crucial issue under the law of 
torts, but an issue of fact that a jury could (and did) decide in her favor, 
given all the factors at play in the case.84 
In terms of tort law, the Syester outcome seems both viscerally 
satisfying and doctrinally ballpark, even if marginal, given all the 
equitable factors in plaintiff’s favor.85 On the contract side, though, the 
issue is more complicated. The reason why the case even invokes 
contract law is because the plaintiff had earlier threatened a tort action, 
but she abandoned that suit pursuant to an agreement with the 
defendant.86 Settlement agreements are favorites of the law, and for 
good reason. To rescind that agreement and successfully pursue her tort 
action, plaintiff had to show that the earlier settlement was induced by 
fraudulent or material misrepresentations upon which she had reasonably 
relied.87 It does not appear, however, that the lies she was told to induce 
the settlement were any different than the lies she had been told 
originally—lies that she had already asserted to be fraudulent, before the 
settlement agreement was concluded.88 Could she have reasonably relied 
79. Id. at 671–72. 
80. Id. at 673. 
81. Id. at 669, 673. 
82. 133 N.W.2d 666. 
83. See id. at 674. 
84. See id. at 673. 
85. Plaintiff Syester was a widow, of advanced age, and apparently not in affluent circumstances, 
given that she worked as “coffee girl” in a cafeteria. See id. at 669. On the other hand, as Professor 
Threedy has pointed out, she was able to come up with some substantial amounts of cash for her 
dancing lessons. Threedy, supra note 77, at 768 n.94 and accompanying text. Professor Threedy has 
questioned the tendency to see cases like this one through lenses of gender, perhaps of gender bias. 
See generally Threedy, supra note 77. 
86. Syester, 133 N.W.2d at 672. 
87. See id. at 673; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981). 
88. See Syester, 133 N.W.2d at 670–72. 
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a second time? What happened to that bit of folk wisdom, “Fool me 
once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me”? 
A possible answer lies in an alternate characterization of the 
plaintiff’s case for rescission, one that the Syester court did not consider: 
perhaps the settlement agreement was procured not merely by fraudulent 
misrepresentations, but by “undue influence.” This defensive doctrine 
can apply when the parties are in a distinctly unequal position—one 
dominant, psychologically at least, and the other subservient—and the 
former takes unfair and unreasonable advantage of that fact.89 This may 
happen when the parties are in a formal fiduciary relationship, but the 
doctrine can also apply when there is a de facto relation of dependence 
that the dominant party is aware of, and exploits.90 Mrs. Syester’s former 
dance instructor testified eloquently, if somewhat ungrammatically, 
about the campaign of persuasion that he engaged in to get plaintiff to 
abandon her claim.91 The combination of factors in the case makes it 
almost a poster child—or perhaps, literally, a “textbook case”—for the 
employment of an undue influence rationale. 
IV. WHO’S RIGHT, AND WHY? JUDGE V. JUDGE 
A common criticism of the focus on appellate cases is that students 
are not forced to reach their own conclusions, being handed a 
prepackaged result with its accompanying justification already worked 
out. Fair enough; certainly that is usually the case. But sometimes the 
decision of a case provokes from a multi-judge panel more than one 
opinion. Casebook editors love cases with dissenting opinions, because 
these immediately hit the student-reader with an important proposition: 
“maybe the majority’s decision is not in fact the best way to resolve the 
case.” Hopefully a capable instructor would get to that point anyway, in 
the classroom. But a dissenting opinion has the virtue of being not just 
after-the-fact second-guessing, but the immediate assertion of a strongly 
held difference of opinion, voiced by a judge with just as much 
information about the case as her colleague who wrote for the majority. 
Here are some examples of dissenting opinions that have seemed to 
me particularly useful. In 1977, J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay 
Chelsea, Inc.92 presented New York’s Court of Appeals, its highest 
court, with the question whether a commercial tenant’s lateness in giving 
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177. 
90. E.g., Broomfield v. Kosow, 212 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1965). 
91. See Syester, 133 N.W.2d at 671–72. 
92. 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977). 
 
                                                     
11 - Knapp Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:13 PM 
2013] CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 1369 
notice of its intention to exercise an option to renew a lease on restaurant 
premises could be excusable on equitable grounds, allowing the tenant to 
retain its leasehold.93 The seven judges split 4–3 in favor of the tenant,94 
after three lower courts had divided over the issue.95 Even without a 
dissent, Judge Wachtler’s majority opinion would be interesting for its 
structure: the opinion first marshals considerable authority—New York 
case law, treatises, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—for the 
proposition that a notice exercising an option must be given within the 
time specified in order to be effective.96 “Thus,” the court continued, 
“the tenant had no legal right to exercise the option when it did, but to 
say that is simply to pose the issue; it does not resolve it. Of course the 
tenant would not be asking for equitable relief if it could establish its 
rights at law.”97 
For the present-day student, probably used to encountering the 
distinction between law and equity only in the context of procedural 
rules (if at all), this may come as something of a surprise. The majority 
opinion then proceeds to point out various equitable factors in the case: 
the tenant made valuable improvements (some apparently after the 
deadline for renewal had passed); the landlord was aware both of the 
tenant’s improvements and of its apparent ignorance of the notice 
requirement (ignorance which the landlord made no effort to dispel); and 
there may well have been negligence but there was no bad faith on the 
tenant’s part.98 Conceding the danger that a tenant in some later case 
could opportunistically delay giving notice and then claim that its 
lateness was merely excusable negligence, the majority nevertheless 
concluded that this tenant should not be denied equitable relief merely 
because some later tenant might be found to have acted in bad faith: 
“[b]y its nature equitable relief must always depend on the facts of the 
particular case and not on hypotheticals.”99 
Writing in dissent, Chief Judge Breitel countered by stressing the 
need for a “reliable” rule, to avoid the “instability and uncertainty” that 
would allow for “ad hoc dispensations in particular cases.”100 This is an 
area, he asserted, where “opportunities for distortion and manipulation 
93. See id. at 1316. 
94. Id. at 1318, 1322. 
95. See id. at 1314.  
96. See id. at 1316. 
97. Id. 
98. See id. at 1315, 1317–18. 
99. Id. at 1318. 
100. Id. at 1321 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting). 
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are . . . great.”101 Whichever argument one agrees with, the opposing 
opinions force the reader to face squarely the conflicting policies at stake 
and illustrate the difference in perspective between “law” and “equity.” 
Another example of dueling opinions that nicely frame the issues is 
found in Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.102 In that case, a 
subcontractor claimed he was deceived by the general contractor into 
signing a written excavation contract for a lump-sum price he already 
knew to be unreasonably low, because the subcontractor had begun the 
work and he feared not getting paid for the work already done.103 He 
claimed to have agreed to sign only on the strength of a promise that he 
would be fairly treated despite the existence of the writing.104 Despite 
clearly stated allegations of fraud (and more than a suggestion of 
wrongful duress, on the facts), a majority of the Montana Supreme Court 
agreed with Chief Justice Turnage’s opinion that the parol evidence rule 
barred consideration of the plaintiff’s claim.105 Despite that rule’s 
traditional exception for fraud, the Court relied on a narrow “exception 
to the exception,” finding that because the asserted fraudulent promise 
directly contradicted the writing, it could not be proven.106 Parties to a 
contract must be able to rely on its express terms without fear that the 
law will later permit the other party to change those terms, the court 
asserted, otherwise “commercial stability” will be destroyed.107 
Writing for a two-person minority, Justice Trieweiler argued that the 
majority applied a legally dubious precedent with a potential for “terrible 
injustice.”108 Alluding to the majority’s concern for “reliance” on 
contracts,109 the dissent countered that “general contractors who induce 
subcontractors to enter into a written agreement by fraudulent 
representations should find no security in the piece of paper which 
resulted from their culpable conduct.”110 Again, whichever side one 
ultimately agrees with, the judges themselves have presented the 
arguments that each side must address. 
Sometimes judicial disagreements are voiced not in the same case, but 
101. Id. For further discussion of the J.N.A. decision, see Knapp, supra note 13.  
102. 815 P.2d 1135 (Mont. 1991). 
103. See id. at 1136. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. at 1136–37. 
106. See id. at 1137. 
107. Id. at 1137 (quoting Baker v. Bailey, 782 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Mont. 1989)). 
108. Id. at 1139 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting). 
109. See id. at 1137 (majority opinion). 
110. Id. at 1139 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting). 
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in cases that raise similar issues but decide them differently. A pair of 
familiar “chestnut” cases111 that have this quality is Mills v. Wyman112 
and Webb v. McGowin.113 (Some casebook editors add a third: 
Harrington v. Taylor.114) Without recounting here a set of stories which 
most contracts teachers already know well, suffice it to say that both 
factually and doctrinally these are cases that, particularly when taken 
together, are challenging and (potentially at least) pedagogically useful. 
Substantially more significant in terms of policy issues are the opinions 
of Federal Court of Appeals Judge Learned Hand and California 
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor in the classic pair of cases, James 
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.115 and Drennan v. Star Paving Co.116 
Although decided a quarter-century later, Traynor’s application of 
promissory estoppel in a withdrawn-bid case has been seen as a direct 
response to Hand’s earlier attempt to confine that doctrine to non-
commercial situations,117 and contracts casebooks have traditionally 
presented these decisions as a contrasted pair.118 Traynor’s view may 
have prevailed in that particular line of cases,119 but strong differences of 
opinion remain among judges and commentators about the proper place 
of promissory estoppel in general contract law.120 
V. HOW’RE THEY DOING? LAWYERS AT WORK 
Another way of using case reports is to focus on issues that may 
confront an attorney as a dispute develops and works its way towards 
some kind of resolution. Courses in lawyering, dispute resolution, legal 
ethics, and the like all in various ways address these questions in depth 
and detail. But even in a basic first-year course like Contracts, they can 
be recognized when the occasion arises. Although the temptation to 
second-guess how a case was handled should not be lightly indulged—
111. See supra Part I.  
112. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).  
113. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). 
114. 36 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1945). 
115. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). 
116. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
117. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract Law: 
Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169 (1997). 
118. E.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 292, 295 (8th ed. 2012); 
KNAPP ET AL., supra note 2, at 248, 251. 
119. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 2, at 256. 
120. See e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Traynor (Drennan) v. Hand (Baird): Much Ado About (Almost) 
Nothing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 539 (2011). 
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case reports are not always detailed enough for that—at least issues can 
be raised, and sometimes the answers seem clear. 
In Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd.,121 a group of 
entrepreneurs hatched a plan to create and exploit a “flagpole sitting” 
champion—to be given the nom de pole of “Woody Hightower”122—to 
appear at various venues such as “concerts, state fairs and shopping 
centers.”123 They engaged attorney Wartzman to advise them in 
incorporating their venture and in raising money through the sale of 
stock to investors.124 After the entrepreneurs formed the corporation, 
raised substantial money, and began operations (including the selection 
of a young man to be their Woody),125 Wartzman informed his clients 
that no more stock could be sold because the corporation was “structured 
wrong,” which apparently meant that the state’s securities law had not 
been complied with.126 To remedy the problem, he recommended that 
they consult with a “securities specialist”127—something that Wartzman 
clearly was not. They asked Wartzman to foot the bill (an estimated cost 
of $10,000–$15,000), but he refused.128 Faced with the prospect of 
substantial additional legal fees and an indefinite delay in using funds 
already raised, they ran Woody back down the flagpole.129 Their 
corporation sued Wartzman’s law firm for breach of contract and 
negligence.130 A trial court awarded the corporation damages for the 
amounts it lost in promoting the aborted venture, and the Maryland 
appellate court affirmed.131 
Wartzman’s firm argued that the plaintiff should have been denied 
recovery because of a failure to “mitigate” its damages,132 but this met 
with a stony judicial response: the plaintiff did not have the money to 
continue paying legal expenses, and could not have raised more money 
because of the defendant’s lack of competence.133 Defendant might have 
121. 456 A.2d 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). 
122. Id. at 84. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 84–85. 
127. Id. at 84. 
128. Id. at 85. 
129. See id. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 87, 89. 
132. Id. at 85. 
133. Id. at 88–89.  
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avoided liability by showing that the plaintiff’s venture would have 
failed anyway, the court suggested,134 but it had the opportunity to prove 
that at trial, and failed to do so.135 Plaintiff’s inability to prove its 
likelihood of success precluded any recovery of expectation damages for 
lost profits; conversely, defendant’s inability to prove the likelihood of 
plaintiff’s failure left the defendant open to liability for plaintiff’s 
“reliance damages.”136 However, had the defendant been willing to 
assume the burden of paying to have the needed additional legal services 
performed by someone else, then Woody could have resumed his perch 
atop the pole, and the plaintiff’s venture could have gone ahead. In that 
case the defendant would have had to swallow that cost, but it would 
probably have avoided the far greater liability ultimately imposed in this 
lawsuit, either because the venture succeeded (in which event the 
plaintiff wouldn’t have incurred those losses after all), or it failed, 
enabling the defendant to meet its burden of proof on that crucial issue. 
Either way, future lawyers wouldn’t still be reading, a generation later, 
the cautionary tale of Woody v. Wartzman. 
A somewhat better exhibition of lawyering—on both sides—can be 
found in Sackett v. Spindler,137 a 1967 case involving the sale of a local 
newspaper in a small California town.138 The contract of sale provided 
for a series of advance payments by the buyer, followed by a final 
payment in exchange for delivery to the buyer of all the stock in the 
publishing corporation.139 The buyer made the first three payments more 
or less as scheduled, but when it came time for the final payment, his 
check bounced.140 The seller in the meantime had placed the stock 
certificates in escrow, reclaiming them when the buyer’s check failed to 
clear.141 The buyer by this time was apparently dealing not only with 
health problems of an unspecified nature, but also with divorce 
proceedings.142 Neither of those factors provided him with a legal excuse 
for nonperformance under the contract, but they may in fact have made 
it difficult for him to perform as promised, as well as quite probably 
diminishing his enthusiasm for embarking on this publishing venture. 
134. Id. at 88. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 86–88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 cmt. a (1981). 
137. 56 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1967). 
138. Id. at 438.  
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 439.  
141. Id. at 438. 
142. Id. at 439. 
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Over the next several weeks the buyer kept proclaiming his intention to 
(eventually) pay, while the seller continued to assert his right to 
immediate payment.143 In the meantime the value of the newspaper as a 
going enterprise sank lower and lower.144 At one point the seller 
declared that he would treat the buyer as being in total breach, but 
shortly retreated from that position.145 Eventually, though, the seller did 
sell the shares to someone else—at a price well below what this buyer 
had promised to pay146—and sued the buyer for the conventional remedy 
of expectation damages: the difference between the promised contract 
price and the lower price for which the property was eventually sold to 
another.147 
The seller’s dilemma in Sackett stems from uncertainty about the 
nature of the defendant’s failure to perform: assuming that the buyer’s 
various personal problems did not rise to the level of a legal excuse, and 
assuming also that the seller’s tender of the stock met any “constructive 
condition” requirement of a performance on his part, at what point did 
the buyer’s unexcused failure to perform become not merely a “breach,” 
but a “total breach,” entitling the seller to treat the contract as discharged 
and sue for a full damage remedy—a remedy that would include not just 
a refund of his advance payments but the damages stemming from the 
property’s decline in value?148 For the seller to take that position 
prematurely—to “jump the gun,” as we say—would risk forfeiting a 
very substantial damage claim. On the other hand, continued delay by 
the seller meant risking the unwillingness and potentially the inability of 
this buyer to cover the (increasing) loss. 
Two distinct questions can be asked about the quality of the 
lawyering in Sackett. The first is: could/should the seller have attempted 
to protect himself against this uncertainty with appropriate contractual 
language, such as a “time is of the essence” clause, a “drop dead” clause, 
or some such device? The answer would seem to be yes. Of course the 
buyer might not have agreed to such a provision, but that in turn might 
have signaled to the seller the possibility of future problems of the type 
that actually did occur. The other question is whether either attorney 
should have proceeded differently once the seller’s difficulties became 
apparent? The seller did successfully avoid one pitfall, by never at any 
143. Id. at 438–39. 
144. Id. at 433. 
145. Id. at 441–42. 
146. Id. at 442–43. 
147. Id. at 445–46. 
148. See id. at 440–41. 
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point repudiating the contract, which would have put him immediately in 
total breach. And the buyer did not too quickly assert his right to treat 
the contract as terminated. Eventually the seller did make himself whole, 
except for the cost of a lawsuit, making the best of what turned out to be 
a bad deal. Possibly with hindsight the buyer should have tried to buy 
his way out of the deal once his ability (or willingness) to go through 
with it had been undermined. 
VI. HOW MUCH IS THAT IN REAL MONEY? SOME PROBLEMS 
WITH OLDER CASES 
One of the problematic aspects of using actual cases to illustrate legal 
points is that many of these decisions are, well, old—twenty, fifty, 
maybe a hundred years old, or more—and thus may seem antique. This 
can mean that the transactions at issue no longer seem interesting or 
relevant. This doesn’t change the legal principles, of course, but it may 
mean that the issues of law are also less important than they once were. 
If—as seems likely—few contracts of importance are going to be 
concluded today by “snail mail,” then to the modern eye the “mailbox 
rule”149 may seem neither right nor wrong, but merely unimportant. 
Another aspect of older cases is that often the parties are fighting over 
sums of money that to the modern eye are minuscule—essentially 
“chickenfeed.” Of course, one easy (and usually sufficient) answer is 
that one needs to adjust for the changing value of money (yes, Virginia, 
there was a time when $150 was a decent annual salary). And 
occasionally it does seem that the parties may be fighting more about 
some principle—pride? revenge?—than about money.150 
Occasionally, however, a case comes along that dramatically 
illustrates the financial potential of a winning contract suit. Although in 
recent years mass-contractors have routinely tried (with great success) to 
keep customer disputes out of litigation, and to keep small claims from 
being aggregated into big lawsuits, occasionally particularly keen 
lawyering on one side (along with performance that is perhaps less so on 
the other) will navigate past all the procedural shoals and reach a 
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981). 
150. See, for example, Joyner v. Adams, where the plaintiff persisted in pursuing her contract 
action through three trials and three appeals before ultimately losing. See Joyner v. Adams, 387 
S.E.2d 235 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
Plaintiff’s husband was also a lawyer, and his law firm had negotiated the contract that ultimately 
proved insufficient to entitle her to the payments she sought. The plaintiff may have thought she had 
“free” legal services, and her husband may have been reluctant to admit to his wife that he had 
earlier dropped the ball in negotiating the contract. 
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favorable final outcome, or one that is at least final enough to prompt the 
losing side to settle rather than prolong the litigation. 
Such an event was the collection of federal cases reported in 2010 as 
In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation.151 In a multi-district 
proceeding, customers of several major banks sued the banks on a 
variety of grounds, both common law (including breach of contract, 
breach of good faith, and unconscionability) and statutory (various 
consumer protection statutes).152 The major focus of their attack was the 
banks’ admitted practice of posting overdraft charges in such a way as to 
maximize the chargeable fees generated.153 After a lengthy analysis 
covering much ground, including potential federal preemption and the 
remedial power of common-law unconscionability,154 a federal district 
court in Florida denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss,155 concluding 
that the plaintiffs had indeed stated several potentially viable claims for 
liability.156 As a result, many of the defendant banks settled their cases, 
rather than proceeding further. One such settlement was reported as 
being for $410 million.157 This would feed a whole lot of really big 
chickens. 
VII. WHO ELSE IS INVOLVED HERE? WIDENING OUR 
PERSPECTIVE 
One by-product of case study for contracts students, not so obvious as 
those already discussed, is that although the typical lawsuit is a two-
party (or at least two-sided) affair, the facts of actual cases frequently 
exhibit more complexity than that. Sometimes there are other persons 
involved in the situation, but not parties to the suit sub judice. Those 
persons may be involved in a separate lawsuit, or they may have 
contributed to the development of the dispute without being themselves 
involved in the resulting litigation. The following discussion provides a 
few examples. 
In 1977, in Lenawee County, Michigan, Carl and Nancy Pickles 
(hereafter referred to grammatically, if somewhat awkwardly, as “the 
Pickleses”) bought from William and Martha Messerly a tract of land 
151. 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
152. Id. at 1307.  
153. Id. at 1308–09. 
154. See id. at 1318–21. 
155. Id. at 1329. 
156. Id.  
157. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  
 
                                                     
11 - Knapp Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:13 PM 
2013] CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 1377 
upon which stood a three-unit apartment building.158 The Messerlys had 
previously bought this property from a Mr. Bloom, who had installed on 
it a septic tank that was (unknown to the Messerlys) in violation of the 
local health code.159 The Messerlys operated the property as an income-
producing rental for a few years, then sold it to another couple, the 
Barneses.160 After a few years, the Barneses defaulted on their purchase 
and deeded the property back to the Messerlys, after which the Pickleses 
made their contract of purchase.161 Almost immediately afterward the 
septic tank problem came (literally) to light when sewage began visibly 
seeping from the ground on the property.162 The Board of Health 
commenced a proceeding against the Messerlys and the Pickleses to 
enjoin habitation of the property until the violation was removed,163 thus 
giving this case its rubric, Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly. 
The Messerlys in turn sued the Pickleses for foreclosure and a 
deficiency judgment, whereupon the Pickleses counter-sued the 
Messerlys—for fraud and rescission—and also sued the Barneses—for 
fraud and misrepresentation.164 At the trial level the Board of Health got 
its injunction, and withdrew from the case,165 after which the court found 
as a fact that there had been no fraud or misrepresentation by either the 
Barneses or the Messerlys and dismissed the Pickleses’ actions against 
both couples.166 The Pickleses appealed the trial court’s judgment in 
denying rescission as against the Messerlys, and an intermediate 
appellate court agreed with the Pickleses, ruling that since both buyers 
and sellers had in fact been ignorant of the unlawful and unhealthful 
condition of the property, there had been a mutual mistake of fact 
sufficient to justify granting rescission in their favor.167 The case then 
went up to the Michigan Supreme Court, which reversed again, on the 
basis of an “as is” clause in the buyers’ contract.168 
One of the attractive features of the Lenawee County case, for 
contracts teachers, is that it enables one to nod in the direction of the 
158. Lenawee Cnty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Mich. 1982). 
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 205–06. 
165. Id. at 206. 
166. Id. 
167. Lenawee Cnty. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 295 N.W.2d 903, 908–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
168. Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 210–11. 
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famous “pregnant cow” case, Sherwood v. Walker,169 without having to 
do a full-scale analysis of that case in all its aspects.170 In reviewing the 
lower court’s grant of rescission based on mutual mistake, the appellate 
court addressed the Sherwood decision, in which Michigan’s high court 
had applied the doctrine of mutual mistake to relieve the seller of a 
contract where “the very nature of the thing” being sold was different 
than the parties had believed it to be.171 In Sherwood the issue was 
whether the cow in question was thought by both parties to be incapable 
of breeding at the time of sale;172 it was later discovered to be 
pregnant.173 The court held that if this was truly a mutual mistake, it 
could be a basis for rescission by the seller.174 Expressing some doubt as 
to the outcome of that case,175 the Michigan Supreme Court in any event 
chose to abandon Sherwood’s rhetoric in favor of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts’ “balancing of factors” approach,176 and 
concluded that the mistake was both “mutual” in fact and also “material” 
enough under the Restatement’s approach to justify rescission.177 
However, the court also went on to rely on the Restatement for the 
proposition that the parties might, by appropriate language in their 
contract, assign the risk of mistake to one party or the other.178 These 
parties had done that, the court ruled, by providing in their contract that 
the buyer would accept the property “as is.”179 
Aside from the court’s somewhat problematic (in my view) reliance 
on the contract’s language, it is instructive to ask how—in the absence 
of that language—a court should decide this case under the 
Restatement’s “allocation of risk” rule of “reasonableness.”180 Two 
169. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
170. As mentioned above, Sherwood would clearly be on anyone’s list of classic contracts 
“chestnuts.” See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
171. Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 208 (quoting Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 923). 
172. 33 N.W. at 919–20. 
173. Id. at 920.  
174. Id. at 923–24. 
175. After opining that the Sherwood decision did not provide a “satisfactory analysis” and 
depended on an “inexact and confusing distinction,” the Lenawee County court, while not 
overruling that decision, asserted that Sherwood’s holding in the future would be limited to its 
facts—awaiting application, presumably, to the next pregnant cow case that comes along. See 
Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 209. 
176. Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 209–10; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 152, 154 (1981). 
177. Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 209–10. 
178. Id. at 210–11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. a). 
179. See Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 211. 
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. c. 
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potentially relevant factors are apparent from the court’s opinion, 
although neither is emphasized. The first is that Bloom—who was not a 
party to the case, and whose whereabouts the court never discussed—is 
the one initially responsible for the whole problem.181 If Bloom had not 
installed a non-conforming (and apparently improperly functioning, at 
least eventually) septic system, the problem would not have arisen.182 
The second factor is that during the period of the Barneses’ ownership, 
they requested and received from the Messerlys permission to sell off an 
acre of land that was originally part of the parcel.183 If that acre of land 
had been retained, it would have been possible to preserve the residential 
character of the property by installing an appropriate (much larger) 
septic field.184 As it was, the amount of land remaining would not 
support that corrective action, making the property in its reduced state 
useless for residential purposes, and essentially valueless.185 If this 
remedial measure indeed is no longer feasible, then we have here an 
unavoidable loss of value. And assuming the trial court’s findings of fact 
are correct, none of the parties to the lawsuit was guilty of knowing the 
true facts and misrepresenting or wrongfully concealing them. 
So in this posture the case presents the classic conundrum: when an 
unavoidable loss occurs, and it must fall on one of two or more innocent 
parties, how do we decide who should bear that loss? There are a lot of 
ways to approach that, probably, but the simplest place to begin is to ask 
which (if any) of the parties is more responsible than the others for the 
loss event? Which one might best have avoided it? Viewed in that light, 
it can plausibly be argued that the only parties not responsible here are 
Mr. and Mrs. Pickles. The Messerlys failed to sufficiently inspect the 
property to begin with, and dealt directly with Bloom; they also had 
plenty of opportunity to inspect the property while they owned it, and 
they gave permission to the Barneses to sell off that extra acre, thereby 
(unwittingly) turning a soluble problem into an insoluble one. The 
Barneses, while they owned the property, also had ample opportunity to 
inspect it, and they were the ones who actually sold off that acre. As for 
the Pickleses, the worst they can be accused of is possible negligence in 
inspecting the property. If that was indeed a dereliction on their part, 
they had plenty of company. Ideally, of course, the liability would have 
181. Lenawee Cnty., 331 N.W.2d at 206. 
182. See id. 
183. Id. at 205, 207. 
184. Id. at 207. 
185. Id.  
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been passed backward to end up ultimately on Bloom, but that appears 
not to have been possible, either practically or legally. 
Another case where a non-party appears to have played a crucial role 
is Morin Building Products Co. v. Baystone Construction, Inc.,186 a 
federal case that arose in Indiana and reached the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals in 1983.187 On its face a simple construction dispute, the case 
is notable for three things: (1) an interesting legal issue, (2) the 
participation of Circuit Judge Richard Posner, and (3) the brooding 
omnipresence of General Motors, Inc. Plaintiff Morin, a subcontractor, 
had contracted with defendant Baystone, a general contractor, to erect 
the aluminum walls called for as part of the defendant’s performance of 
its general contract to build an addition onto one of GM’s Chevrolet 
plants in Muncie, Indiana.188 Incorporating language from the general 
contract as well as adding some of its own, the Morin/Baystone 
subcontract essentially called for the finish on the new aluminum walls 
to match the finish on the walls of the already existing building, to a 
degree satisfactory to GM’s authorized agent.189 When the work was 
done, GM’s representative declared it unacceptable, and rejected it, so 
Baystone refused to pay Morin, and instead hired another contractor to 
redo the work.190 Morin sued Baystone to collect the contract price for 
the work it had done.191 Morin prevailed in the trial court, which held 
that because the evidence showed plaintiff’s performance to have been 
objectively acceptable to a reasonable person, it should not have been 
rejected.192 
On appeal, Judge Posner was clearly torn between the apparent 
strength of contract language that gave GM unfettered discretion in 
granting or withholding its approval, and the well-established common 
law rule that such conditions of “satisfaction” should, if at all possible, 
be construed to require only “objective” (reasonable-person) 
satisfaction.193 This is particularly so where the performance at issue is 
one calling principally for commercial utility, rather than the expression 
186. 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983). 
187. Id. at 413. 
188. Id. at 414–17. 
189. Id. at 414. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 414–15 (discussing the approach stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 228 (1979)). 
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of “personal aesthetics” or the achievement of “artistic effect.”194 After a 
lengthy opinion in which he strove mightily to find some wiggle-room in 
the contract language, Judge Posner threw in the towel and said, 
essentially: “We’re a federal court here, we have to follow state contract 
law, and the district court judge is an experienced Indiana lawyer, so 
there you have it; no paternalism here, for heaven’s sake.”195 The 
“foundations of freedom of contract,” he concluded, happily remain 
intact.196 In other words, General Motors, as the party with the power, is 
still free to do whatever it wants, to whomever it wants—except the 
Morin Building Products Co. 
Beyond the provocative legal issue of whether boilerplate language 
should insulate a contracting party from claims of “commercial 
unreasonableness”—essentially, of “bad faith”—the facts of Morin 
exhibit a classic example of whipsawing. Should Baystone have rejected 
this performance from Morin? Clearly not, in the courts’ judgment. So 
could Baystone instead have accepted Morin’s work to begin with? Not 
unless it was willing to face a potential contract dispute with General 
Motors, presumably. Faced with this dilemma, it’s not surprising that 
Baystone chose to do the bidding of GM. Should GM therefore have 
ultimately borne the price of this loss? Obviously, yes, it should have. 
However, GM was not a party to this lawsuit. So did it, in fact, cover 
Baystone’s loss? From the case report, we can’t tell. We can only trust 
that GM did the right thing. Or hope that perhaps Baystone’s contract 
(presumably drafted by GM’s lawyers) had an indemnification clause for 
just such a situation as this. 
Sometimes the person in the wings, although not a party to the lawsuit 
we are reading, is nevertheless a party to one or more related suits. An 
example can be found in the 1997 case of Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc.197 
Here the off-stage (or in this case, off-screen) person was movie 
actor/director Clint Eastwood, who bore somewhat the same relationship 
to defendant movie production company Warner Brothers as GM did to 
defendant Baystone in Morin. Eastwood had previously ended a long-
term personal and professional relationship with actress and aspiring 
director Sondra Locke, an event which precipitated “palimony” litigation 
that eventually culminated (at least temporarily) in a settlement 
agreement.198 The settlement agreement involved not only substantial 
194. See id. at 415–16. 
195. See id. at 415–17. 
196. See id. at 417. 
197. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Ct. App. 1997). 
198. See id. at 922. 
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payments by Eastwood to Locke, in money and real property, but also 
Eastwood’s agreement to cause Warner Brothers to enter into a 
“development deal” with Locke—an arrangement that would guarantee 
substantial payments to her from Warner over a three-year period, plus 
the possibility of additional payoff (both financial and professional) 
should Warner accept for production one or more of her projects or 
employ her as a director.199 
Time passed and Locke received from Warner her guaranteed 
payment, but nothing more; no project of hers was chosen by Warner for 
further development nor was she employed to direct any film.200 She 
then sued Warner for fraud and breach of contract, claiming that Warner 
from the beginning had intended not to accept any of her projects, 
pursuant to an agreement to that effect with Eastwood201 (who in fact 
had indirectly reimbursed Warner for the payments it made to her202). 
There was some evidence of this in communications between Warner 
executives.203 A California trial court granted Warner summary 
judgment on all of Locke’s claims, however, ruling that Warner had no 
contractual duty to actually approve any of her projects, because under 
their contract it had non-reviewable discretion to make such artistic 
judgments of her work, pro and con.204 
On appeal, a California court of appeal reversed for trial, declaring 
that while the implied covenant of good faith did not require Warner to 
actually accept any of her projects, it might at least require that Warner 
consider them in good faith and use its honest judgment in assessing 
their merits, rather than categorically declining even to consider them.205 
If Locke’s story was true, Eastwood—like GM, above206—had 
manipulated the defendant to behave in a way that violated the rights of 
the plaintiff in this lawsuit. Unlike GM, however, which may have paid 
no price for its actions, Eastwood was also sued by Locke for fraud (in 
procuring her agreement to the Locke-Warner contract); that suit was 
 
 
199. Id. Her contract with Warner guaranteed Locke a total of $750,000 over a three-year period. 
Id. 
200. Id. 
201. See id. at 922–23.  
202. Id. at 922. 
203. Id. at 923. 
204. Id. at 923–24. 
205. Id. at 926–27. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 186–95. 
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apparently settled at the last minute, when jury deliberations had actually 
begun.207 
VIII. WHAT JUST HAPPENED THERE? PLAYING THE OFF-
STAGE SCENE 
Attorneys need to know more than rules of law, obviously. One of the 
skills an attorney must develop is the ability to determine what facts she 
does not know, and whether those facts are important to a legal analysis. 
Frequently, in a judicial opinion, there are brief references to interactions 
between the parties that might be relevant, but these are left incomplete 
and undeveloped. Students should be encouraged to imagine what might 
have taken place, in light of the facts that are available. 
Berryman v. Kmoch208 provides one example of this genre. In that 
case, a Colorado real estate developer claimed that he had an enforceable 
120-day written option to buy certain Kansas farmland, which the 
farmer/seller breached by selling to another buyer before the 120 days 
had expired.209 The buyer, Kmoch, claimed that he had requested that 
amount of time to consider his purchase because he would need to find 
investors to participate in the venture before going ahead.210 Eventually, 
after the buyer had attempted to enforce the agreement, the seller, 
Berryman (who by this time had sold to another buyer) sued for a 
declaratory judgment that the option was not enforceable.211 The court 
analyzed the transaction both for the presence of consideration and the 
possible application of promissory estoppel, and concluded that neither 
would apply to prevent the seller’s revocation of his offer to sell.212 
But along the way, in the course of telling this story, the court writes 
as follows: “Berryman called Kmoch by telephone and asked to be 
released from the option agreement. Nothing definite was worked out 
between them.”213 This call was some five weeks or so after the initial 
transaction, and we know from the facts that the buyer really hoped that 
this deal would go through, while by this time the seller did not.214 Even 
if an option is not legally enforceable and the offer is therefore a 
207. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 2, at 497–98. 
208. 559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977). 
209. Id. at 792–93. 
210. Id. at 794. 
211. Id. at 792–93. 
212. Id. at 793–95. 
213. Id. at 793 (emphasis added). 
214. See id. at 792. 
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revocable one, there might still be a claim that the offer was actually 
accepted before it was revoked. So a material issue here could be: was 
the offer revoked during that conversation? Ordinarily, we would 
assume that when an offeror communicates his intention not to perform, 
this in effect amounts to a revocation of his offer. But here we are told 
that the seller “asked to be released.”215 That suggests he may have 
considered himself bound—legally, or at least morally—to keep the 
offer open. Did he nevertheless revoke? 
To answer that question, one would need to know the actual telephone 
conversation. Here is one possible version: 
Seller [Berryman]: Look, I know I said you could have 120 days 
to think over our deal, but I have a buyer ready and willing to go 
ahead now. I can’t risk losing that deal unless you assure me that 
you’re going to go ahead. Otherwise I’m going to have to ask 
you to release me from our agreement. 
Buyer [Kmoch]: I appreciate your problem, but you promised 
me 120 days to consider this deal, and it’s only been about a 
month; I need more time. I’ve put a lot of time and effort into 
this already; it’s not fair for you to just walk away here. I’ll let 
you know just as soon as I decide whether I can go ahead or not, 
but you can’t back out now. You gave me a legally binding 
option. I’m going to have to insist that you to give me more 
time. 
Seller: That’s just unreasonable, and you know it. I need to 
know now. 
Buyer: Well, that’s the way it is. I expect you to stand by your 
word. 
One could go on for few more exchanges, but you get the idea. At this 
point, was the offer revoked? Reasonable people might differ, I suppose. 
This (hopefully) reasonable person would say no—that on this version of 
the facts, the desire to withdraw was there, but never unequivocally 
expressed. Of course there was not yet an acceptance, either, but that’s 
the whole point of an option: to permit the offeree to delay his decision 
while keeping the offeror bound to the prospective exchange. 
Park 100 Investors, Inc. v. Kartes216 provides another example of an 
incomplete account. There, an Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a lower 
court’s finding that the landlord of some business premises had 
fraudulently manipulated the individual principals of the tenant 
215. Id. at 793. 
216. 650 N.E.2d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
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corporation, James and Nancy Kartes, into personally guaranteeing the 
lease obligation, by deceiving the Karteses into signing what they 
believed to be merely copies of the proposed lease agreement.217 The 
guarantees had not been agreed to or even discussed by the Karteses and 
the landlord beforehand.218 The signing took place in a hurried meeting 
in a building lobby, where the Karteses were approached by Scannell, 
the landlord’s representative, when they were on the verge of departing 
for the day, and told that before leaving they had to sign some “lease 
papers.”219 Before he signed what he apparently assumed to be just 
copies of the lease, from the lobby James Kartes telephoned upstairs to 
Kaplan, a senior officer of their corporation, and asked him if the lease 
agreement had been approved by the corporation’s lawyer.220 “Scannell 
remained silent,” we are told by the court.221 
We are not, however, told what Kaplan said. Presumably he said 
“yes,” because the lease agreement in fact had been approved by the 
corporation’s lawyer. But why didn’t he also say, “why do you ask?” Or 
maybe he did. If so, a little more conversation should have revealed to 
Kartes that Scannell was up to something at least odd. Even if Scannell 
did act with fraudulent intent, for Kartes later to assert a defense based 
on fraud he has to have been not only the recipient of a 
misrepresentation, but to have reasonably relied on it.222 The Park 100 
case seems to come out the right way, but the account of what actually 
happened is unsatisfyingly incomplete. 
A different kind of imagined scenario is that classroom staple, the 
“what if—?” hypothetical. By varying the facts of the actual case, one 
can evaluate the court’s analysis. A case already mentioned above, Webb 
v. McGowin,223 to my mind serves as an ideal example. In Webb, the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s decedent, McGowin, made a 
promise of life-time support to Webb as a reward for Webb saving 
McGowin’s life by diverting a heavy block of wood that was about to 
fall from an upper floor and potentially crush him.224 Plaintiff asserted 
that he had voluntarily allowed himself to fall with the block so as to 
keep it from hitting McGowin, suffering severe injuries himself in the 
217. Id. at 347–48. 
218. Id. at 348. 
219. Id.  
220. Id.  
221. Id. at 348. 
222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). 
223. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). See supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
224. Webb, 168 So. at 196–97. 
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process.225 The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer on the ground 
of lack of consideration, because the alleged promise occurred only after 
the plaintiff’s heroic act had been performed.226 “Past consideration is 
not consideration,” as the legal maxim has it.227 But the appellate court 
held that in cases such as this “the subsequent promise to pay is an 
affirmation or ratification of the services rendered carrying it with the 
presumption that a previous request for the service was made.”228 
So what the court wanted to see was a previous request from 
McGowin? Well, what if, as the plaintiff stood poised on the edge of the 
opening above McGowin’s head, McGowin had looked up, perceived 
his danger, and cried out “Help!!” If Webb replies, “What’s it worth to 
you?” and McGowin answers, “Fifteen dollars every other week for the 
rest of your life!,” after which Webb takes the fall, then the court has the 
actual bargained-for exchange it seems to want, instead of merely a 
“presumed” one. Of course, as students immediately perceive, it also has 
a probable case of duress.229 What Webb really presents is a case where 
the doctrine of consideration is not adequate to get the court to where it 
wants to go.230 Instead of a problematic legal fiction of bargain, based on 
a non-existent preliminary request, the court should simply declare that 
this is an appropriate case for recognizing the enforceability of a promise 
made for a benefit already received.231 
IX. IRRATIONAL ACTORS? OR JUST (SEEMINGLY) 
IRRATIONAL ACTIONS? 
One of the challenges that real cases can present is explaining the 
seemingly irrational actions of the parties. Understanding the 
motivations of human behavior is a useful skill for everyday life, but for 
lawyers it’s a vocational requirement. 
We have already seen in Katz v. Danny Dare232 a case where what 
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 197.  
227. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO’S CONTRACTS § 5.2 (6th ed. 2009). 
228. Webb, 168 So. at 198.  
229. This assumes that Webb had sufficient control over the block that he could either let it hit 
McGowin or not. (Although seemingly a stretch, this is essentially what Webb alleged in his 
complaint.) In that case, Webb would appear to have obtained McGowin’s promise by (in effect) an 
improper threat, amounting to duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). 
230. This is what the concurring judge in effect admits. See Webb, 168 So. at 199. 
231. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does, in section 86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 86 cmt d, illus. 7 (1981) (based on Webb case). 
232. 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 60–76. 
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otherwise might have seemed an irrational act is revealed as not only 
rational, but all too human: the president of the defendant corporation 
was willing to promise plaintiff Katz a lifetime pension if he would 
retire voluntarily, even though as an at-will employee he could simply 
have been fired, because Katz was the president’s brother-in-law, and 
considerations of love, loyalty, and family/marital harmony were 
collectively stronger than mere efficiency.233 
If the plaintiff retirees were to be believed, similar promises were 
made in Plowman v. Indian Refining Co.234 to a group of senior 
employees who also could simply have been fired outright.235 The 
defendant’s agent offered no explanation, other than possible altruism on 
the company’s part.236 In that case, however, a more plausible motive for 
defendant’s seeming generosity could have been found in the desire to 
preserve a different kind of harmony: the defendant may have wanted to 
cut its labor costs while at the same time keeping its remaining work 
force together and happy until the proposed sale of the company had 
been accomplished.237 
Intra-family tensions also might have been at work in Ray v. William 
G. Eurice & Bros.,238 a 1952 Maryland case. Defendant construction 
firm, owned and operated by two brothers, entered into a written 
contract to build a home for the plaintiffs, a married couple, only to later 
repudiate that contract angrily and declare unwillingness to perform.239 
Although somewhat complex facts involving several draft versions of 
the contract enabled the defendant’s officers to plausibly (at least to the 
trial court) claim that they had actually not intended to sign the particular 
document in question,240 a more believable explanation lies in the 
relative roles of the two brothers. One, John, appears to have handled the 
business side; the other, Henry, managed the construction process.241 
The latter brother took little or no part in the negotiation of the contract, 
233. Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 122–23.  
234. 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937). 
235. Id. at 2. 
236. See id. 
237. The promises that defendant Indian Refining made to the plaintiff retirees all required them 
to come to the plant and pick up their checks at the office, presumably when the other employees 
would be picking up theirs. See id. at 3. Assuming the plaintiffs truly were promised lifetime 
pensions, the prospect of selling its business could also explain why the defendant was willing to 
make that part of its promises orally but not in writing. 
238. 93 A.2d 272 (Md. 1952). 
239. Id. at 274–75.  
240. Id. at 275. 
241. See id. at 275–76. 
 
                                                     
11 - Knapp Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:13 PM 
1388 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1357 
but complained violently about some of its terms once he eventually 
focused on the details.242 This shouldn’t change the outcome of the 
case—the appellate court later reversed the trial court and held the 
brothers’ firm liable for breach of contract243—but it does provide an 
explanation for otherwise seemingly irrational behavior on Henry’s part. 
X. WHAT’S GOING ON HERE? THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE 
COURTROOM 
Part of the heritage of Legal Realism is the recognition that law does 
not exist in a vacuum, that whatever is happening in society is inevitably 
reflected in the behavior of courts. Real-life cases remind us of that truth 
in a way that academic hypotheticals are unlikely to do. 
The Plowman244 case, for instance, takes place against the 
background of the Great Depression of the 1930s. That context may 
account for the behavior of the defendant employer, trying to keep its 
business afloat, and points up the predicament of the plaintiff employees, 
discharged at a time when they were unlikely to find other employment. 
The social setting is also reflected in the Plowman court’s lengthy 
discussion of society’s responsibility to provide for the needs of retiring 
workers,245 a responsibility that was, at that point, still unmet—Social 
Security came later. 
Another case perhaps reflective of its time and place is Alaska 
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico,246 the well-known 1902 case involving a 
dispute between a salmon cannery and the men it had hired to fish for a 
season in Alaskan waters.247 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
had agreed to their demands for an increase in their rate of 
compensation, following a dispute about working conditions.248 A trial 
court found a lack of consideration for the asserted promise, but 
enforced it anyway;249 the appellate court agreed as to lack of 
consideration, but held that fatal to plaintiffs’ claim.250 Like Plowman, 
the Alaska Packers’ case was actually decided on the narrow, 
242. Id. at 276.  
243. Id. at 280. 
244. Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937).  
245. See id. at 5.  
246. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
247. See id. at 555. 
248. Id.  
249. Domenico v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 112 F. 554, 556–57 (N. D. Cal. 1901). 
250.  Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 117 F. at 102–05. 
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“technical” basis of lack of consideration, but some have seen it as a 
paradigm example of duress at work.251 Others, perhaps more 
sympathetic to the workers’ side of things, may see it not just as a 
“contract” case, but as a “strike”—a labor dispute, decided at a time 
when most courts did not look favorably on the efforts of workers to 
organize and bargain collectively.252 
Other cases arise or are decided against a backdrop of national or 
even world events, sometimes reflected in the court’s opinion, 
sometimes not. A dramatic example is the 1949 decision in Batsakis v. 
Demotsis,253 in which a Texas appellate court enforced a 1942 
agreement made between two Greek nationals (written in Greek, and 
made in Greece).254 In that agreement, defendant Eugenia Demotsis 
promised to repay to plaintiff George Batsakis $2,000 American, with 
interest, after the end of “the present war” (World War II).255 The 
defendant argued that what she really received from the plaintiff was not 
in fact 2,000 American dollars but 500,000 Greek drachmae, worth far 
less.256 Although the lower court had substantially reduced the plaintiff’s 
recovery on the strength of that defense,257 the appellate court enforced 
the entire $2,000 obligation, using the rhetoric of consideration doctrine, 
which does not require a balanced or “even” exchange.258 The court 
itself never mentions the surrounding circumstances of the case, 
including the fact that Greece was at the time in the grip of Axis 
occupation, famine, and runaway inflation. Whether these background 
facts should matter to the decision is a matter for speculation—duress, 
fraud, and undue influence are some of the possibilities, depending on 
one’s assumption of additional facts259—but none of that seems to have 
occurred to the court. 
251. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.22, at 273 n.15 (4th ed. 2004) (“particularly 
outrageous threats”); see also Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 
1983) (Judge Richard Posner stating that a breach of contract may be considered wrongful duress, 
as exemplified by Alaska Packers’ case). 
252. The case is examined in detail in Professor Debora Threedy’s article, A Fish Story: Alaska 
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 185, 218–20. 
253. 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).  
254. Id. at 673–75.  
255. Id. at 673–74. 
256. Id. at 674. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 675.  
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. e (1981) (noting that extreme 
imbalance of a bargain suggests the possible presence of other defects such as mistake, fraud, 
duress, or under influence). 
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Our changing sexual mores have often been the focus of litigation, 
sometimes in disputes involving contract law. In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield 
School District,260 in 1966, a California appellate court upheld (at least 
in theory—the decision reversed a judgment for defendant on 
demurrer261) the plaintiff’s attempt to rescind his resignation from an 
elementary school teaching position.262 He had been arrested for 
homosexual conduct (then a criminal offense) and subjected to pressure 
from the defendant employer that ultimately persuaded him to resign.263 
The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s complaint did allege facts 
sufficient to amount to undue influence, potentially a basis for 
rescission, and reversed for trial.264 Though the court’s opinion has a few 
examples of the kind of casual sexism about the respective roles of men 
and women that were typical of the time,265 on the issue of homosexual 
conduct, the court seems to transcend completely the homophobic 
attitudes of the day. It never suggested that if the plaintiff were indeed 
homosexual, this should somehow disqualify him from the law’s 
protection. Ironically, however, a decision that most contracts students 
are taught to regard as a victory for the plaintiff appears to have been a 
Pyrrhic one at best, benefitting the plaintiff not at all. In fact he never did 
regain his teaching license, and was unable to return to the classroom 
(according to investigations conducted by Professor Kellye Testy,266 the 
case is one of many whose true facts were very different from those 
alleged, but since the case was never tried this is not reflected in the 
legal record.267). 
On the other hand, the changing social attitudes toward cohabitation 
outside of marriage have been tested in many cases over the years, and 
gradually those changes have been reflected in shifts in the courts’ view 
toward legal issues, such as “palimony.” One example is Watts v. 
Watts,268 in which a female plaintiff, in 1987, was able to persuade a 
Wisconsin court to endorse the possibility that, despite the lack of a 
marital relationship, she might be able to claim a portion of her former 
260. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
261. Id. at 537. 
262. Id. at 538.  
263. See id. at 537. 
264. Id. at 543.  
265. See id. at 541. 
266. CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL, supra note 14, at 7–11. 
267. Other examples include Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825), and Webb v. 
McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).  
268. 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). 
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partner’s wealth on a number of theories—express contract, contract 
implied in fact, restitution.269 Again, the theoretical arguments in the 
case take on added weight when they arise from the context of an actual 
case. Whatever one’s feelings about the public policy of encouraging 
marriage, it’s hard not to sympathize with a female plaintiff who appears 
to have been so thoroughly exploited by her partner as was Sue Ann 
Watts. Ms. Watts, in addition to “cleaning, cooking, laundering, 
shopping, running errands” and “contribut[ing] personal property” to the 
relationship, was allowed by Mr. James Watts to “maintain[] the grounds 
surrounding the parties’ home,” despite the fact that he was the operator 
of a landscaping business.270 As they say, you can’t make this stuff up. 
XI. WHO SAYS SO—AND DOES IT MATTER? THE EVOLUTION 
OF CONTRACT JUDGING 
Finally, one thing that study of judicial opinions can do is to illustrate 
graphically the differences in judicial style. The differences can be seen 
in more than just language style, although Justice Cardozo’s flowery and 
convoluted rhetoric271 is very different from Judge Posner’s direct, 
269. Id. at 305, 309, 313, 315–16. 
270. Id. at 306. Besides her wifely-type performance, Ms. Watts performed services for Mr. 
Watts’s business, as receptionist, typist, and bookkeeper. Id. at 306–07. 
271. Here is my favorite example of Cardozo’s style. It’s long, because brevity is not the 
hallmark of Cardozo’s judicial prose:  
The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure of his duty by less than 
full performance. They do say, however, that an omission, both trivial and innocent, will 
sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the 
breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture. The distinction is akin to that between 
dependent and independent promises, or between promises and conditions. Some promises are 
so plainly independent that they can never by fair construction be conditions of one another. 
Others are so plainly dependent that they must always be conditions. Others, though dependent 
and thus conditions when there is departure in point of substance, will be viewed as 
independent and collateral when the departure is insignificant. Considerations partly of justice 
and partly of presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed in 
one class or in another. The simple and the uniform will call for different remedies from the 
multifarious and the intricate. The margin of departure within the range of normal expectation 
upon a sale of common chattels will vary from the margin to be expected upon a contract for 
the construction of a mansion or a ‘skyscraper.’ There will be harshness sometimes and 
oppression in the implication of a condition when the thing upon which labor has been 
expended is incapable of surrender because united to the land, and equity and reason in the 
implication of a like condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is in shape to be returned. 
From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent of their 
uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion 
that they may not be so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention not otherwise 
revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something 
else is in view, it must not be left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to 
visit venial faults with oppressive retribution. 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890–91 (N.Y. 1921) (citations omitted).  
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almost conversational tone.272 It is commonly asserted that there was a 
shift in contract law over the course of the twentieth century, from a 
“classical” rule-based approach to a more “modern,” contextual one. 
This shift can be explored through excerpts from commentators who 
have discussed this evolutionary process,273 but it is also instructive to 
actually compare two opinions that exhibit these contrasting traits. 
Thus, in Walker v. Keith,274 a Kentucky appellate court, reversing the 
court below, held in 1964, as a matter of law, that a tenant’s lease-
renewal option could not be enforced because the parties in the lease had 
neither specified the amount of the renewal rent nor supplied a formula 
for its determination.275 This made it necessary, the court asserted, for it 
to make an agreement for the parties if the option was to be enforced, 
and this would be a “paternalistic” task that a court should not have to 
undertake.276 The court glosses over the fact that the court below in fact 
had apparently no difficulty in fixing a “reasonable” rent in the 
circumstances, and also that the apparent intent of the parties (at least 
when the lease was agreed to) was to create an “option”—an enforceable 
right of renewal for the tenant. The appellate court also conveys 
absolutely no information about—nor does it even show any interest 
in—the use to which the tenant had put the property, the reason why he 
wanted to renew, or the reason why the landlord wanted to get rid of 
him. This willingness to decide on the basis of rules alone in an almost 
fact-free analysis seems in harmony with the “classical” mode of 
contract decision-making. 
272. Here is a sample of Posnerian prose, from the Morin case, supra notes 186–97, addressing 
the question what standard of “satisfaction” was called for by the parties’ contract:  
We have to decide which category the contract between Baystone and Morin belongs in. The 
particular in which Morin’s aluminum siding was found wanting was its appearance, which 
may seem quintessentially a matter of “personal aesthetics,” or as the contract put it, “artistic 
effect.” But it is easy to imagine situations where this would not be so. Suppose the manager of 
a steel plant rejected a shipment of pig iron because he did not think the pigs had a pretty 
shape. The reasonable-man standard would be applied even if the contract had an 
“acceptability shall rest strictly with the Owner” clause, for it would be fantastic to think that 
the iron supplier would have subjected his contract rights to the whimsy of the buyer’s agent. 
At the other extreme would be a contract to paint a portrait, the buyer having reserved the right 
to reject the portrait if it did not satisfy him. Such a buyer wants a portrait that will please him 
rather than a jury, even a jury of connoisseurs, so the only question would be his good faith in 
rejecting the portrait. 
Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983). 
273. See the discussion in Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can’t Revoke, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 309, 
316–19, and authorities there cited and discussed. 
274. 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964). 
275. Id. at 205. 
276. Id. at 204.  
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By contrast, in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co.,277 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981 gave plaintiff paving company 
the benefit of a “price protection” usage.278 The decision delayed the 
impact on plaintiff of a sudden price increase by defendant Shell, its 
supplier of asphalt paving material, even though the language of the 
parties’ written agreement ignored or even contradicted the applicability 
of that usage to the parties’ dealings.279 Having before it evidence of all 
the circumstances, the appellate court agreed with the court below that 
the parties must have understood that Shell would respect that usage, as 
a matter of good faith.280 The contrast in approaches between Walker 
and Nanakuli could hardly have been greater. Which approach is 
preferable? It’s a matter of opinion, but at least the nature of the choice 
is made clearer by having two actual examples to study.281 
CONCLUSION? NOT REALLY 
This brief discussion has had as its aim only to demonstrate some of 
the ways in which, to me, the “case method” continues to have vitality 
today, as one means of exploring the body of private law that we call 
“contract.” However, whether either the case method of teaching or even 
contract law itself in its present form will survive in the present century 
is entirely up for grabs. Multiple pressures on law schools may compress 
not only basic courses but all of legal education into a shorter time 
frame, and require kinds of skills training that leave little or no time for 
the luxury of case discussion. And electronic collections of study 
materials—eclectically assembled from on-line sources, or even self-
generated—may shoulder “casebooks” like ours out of the way. Finally, 
however it may be taught, “contract law” as a court-generated body of 
principles and rules may disappear entirely into the black box of 
arbitration. And adhesion “contracts” that have little or nothing to do 
with true “agreement” may become the way in which private obligations 
are created and enforced—if those obligations are enforced at all, that is, 
277. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). 
278. Id. at 778. 
279.  The relevant language in the agreement provided the price was to be “Shell’s Posted Price 
at time of delivery.” Id. 
280. The court actually upheld the jury’s verdict on either of the alternate grounds submitted, 
breach of contract (based on evidence of course of dealing and trade usage) and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith. See Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 805 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
281. A similar contrast is afforded by another pair of cases discussed earlier, James Baird Co. v. 
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933), and Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 
1958). See supra text accompanying notes 115–20.  
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since much of present-day “contracting” seems aimed at preventing any 
enforcement whatsoever against the drafting party.282 
This probably sounds curmudgeonly, and indeed it is. Other 
contributors to this symposium hopefully will take a more, yes, hopeful 
tone. Clearly a lot of our legal climate is in flux, though, and it’s not 
easy to be optimistic about our collective ability to deal with this 
particular kind of climate change. But at least there is a general 
awareness that change is in the air. Plus ca change—well, who knows? 
 
282.  My views on this general topic have been earlier expressed in Charles L. Knapp, Opting out 
or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95 
(2006). 
 
                                                     
